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A Semiotic Analysis: Developing a
New Standard for Scent Marks
ABSTRACT
In recent years, businesses have discovered a new way to
capture consumer loyalty: through their noses. Companies have begun
to invest heavily in the development of scent marks and innovative
digital scent technology that will disseminate signature scents through
the Internet and television; however, the standards surrounding scent
mark registration and infringement remain hazy due to a lack of
precedent and conflicting global legal standards. While US and
European courts have determined that scent marks can exist under
current laws, the registration requirements and infringement
standards remain unclear.
This Note analyzes the four major issues that arise in scent
mark jurisprudence: (1) the written description requirement, (2) the
application of the functionality doctrine, (3) the possibility of scent
depletion, and (4) the risks of scent confusion. Imposing a categorized
registration process and a simplified scent mark infringement analysis
rooted in semiotic-or sign-based-theory can eliminate the concerns
surrounding scent mark analysis. A system that includes a registration
process that requires the presentation of a trademark's semiotic
elements as well as an infringement analysis that mandates only the
examination of consumer-confusion surveys secures the legitimacy of
scent mark registration and serves the traditional rationales for
trademark law.
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As you slide into your friend's brand new car and he laughingly
revs the engine, the sweet, sticky smell of cherry overcomes you. You
glance around for a spilled bottle of cherry Robitussin or a discarded
and melting cherry-flavored Chapstick, but see nothing. Do you
immediately recognize that the car dealership must have added
several drops of Manhattan Oil's cherry-scented fuel fragrance to the
gas tank? The US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) seems to
think you might; it has awarded Manhattan Oil the only scent
trademark currently on the USPTO's Principal Register for its Cherry
Bomb fuel additive, thus acknowledging the cherry scent's ability to
identify and distinguish the product.'
Other companies are quickly learning that scents attract and
retain consumers, just like memorable logos and catchy slogans. One
study suggested that infusing a pizza shop with the scent of lavender
led to increased sales and longer customer stays,2 and Nike has
reported that its customers have demonstrated an 80 percent increase
in intent to purchase when stores are infused with certain scents.3
Scientists are rushing to keep up with the changing market by
inventing digital scent technology-ways to transfer scents over the
Internet and through television.4 As companies begin to pour more
money into developing signature scents and the technology necessary
to produce them, the question arises: How does the law protect this
new form of intellectual property?
The Lanham Act, which governs federal trademark law,
appears to allow the registration of scent marks because it has not
explicitly excluded them.5 Furthermore, the USPTO has taken an
affirmative position on their registration, recognizing scent marks'
ability to fulfill traditional trademark objectives and permitting scent
1. CHERRY SCENT, Registration No. 2,463,044; see also infra Part I.A-B. See
generally Manhattan Oil "Cherry Bomb," SOUTHBAY FUEL INJECTORS, http://www.south
bayfuelinjectors.com/FuelFragrances-Manhattan OilCherryBomb.html (last visited Oct. 7,
2011) (selling a fuel fragrance with a cherry scent).
2. Eric Nagourney, Vital Signs: Sensations; A Hint of Lavender and the Scent of
Money, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2005, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9FO2E5DA1031
F936A35754COA9639C8B63 (detailing a study that found that infusing lavender into a store
caused customers on average to remain fifteen minutes longer and to spend almost four euros
more).
3. The Smell of Commerce: How Companies Use Scents to Sell Their Products,
INDEPENDENT, Aug. 16, 2011, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/media/advertising/the-smell-
of-commerce-how-companies-use-scents-to-sell-their-products-2338142.html.
4. See Mico Tatalovic, Digital Scents, COSMOS, Jan. 12, 2010, http://www.
cosmosmagazine.com/features/online/3230/digital-scents (explaining that one researcher has
created a chip that stores fluids, which is capable of releasing certain scents at specified times).
5. 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §
7:105 (4th ed. 2011).
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mark registration on the principal register.6 However, many members
of the global legal community have expressed serious concerns.7
Because producers have yet to sue over scent infringement, scholars
have debated for twenty years about how such a case would play out
under current federal trademark infringement laws.8 How would
other producers be notified of a scent mark when its description is
necessarily imprecise?9 What types of scents would the functionality
doctrine prohibit?10 Would the number of available scents eventually
run out?" How would judges distinguish among scents, which are
necessarily subjective due to changing environmental conditions and
the characteristics of the smeller?12
The uncertainty these questions have generated prompted a
European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruling, holding that producers
typically cannot register scent marks, even though European law
seemingly allows for registration. 13 Yet even this decision by the ECJ
has not stopped other international organizations and certain
European governments from permitting scent marks within the
boundaries of their own countries. 4 The fragmented and disjunctive
rulings on the use of scent marks have generated confusion for
consumers and producers alike.15 This Note proposes a solution to the
scent mark problem, engaging a semiotic, or sign-based, analysis in
order to ensure that scent mark registration and infringement
analysis support the traditional goals of trademark law.
Part I explains the purposes and doctrines of traditional
trademark law. Part II explores the opposing positions that US and
European courts have taken in addressing the registration of scent
marks. Part III argues that the stances taken by courts and critics
can be distilled down to four major issues: the written description, the
functionality doctrine, scent depletion, and scent confusion. Finally,
Part IV proposes that a categorized, uniform registration process and
a more concise trademark infringement analysis would best serve the
purposes of trademark law within the realm of scent marks.
6. See infra Part II.A.1.
7. See infra Part II.B.
8. See infra Part III.
9. See infra Part III.A.
10. See infra Parts L.C, III.B.
11. See infra Part III.C.
12. See infra Part III.D.
13. See infra Part IIB. 1.
14. See infra Parts II.B.2-3, II.C.
15. See infra Part II.B.3.
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I. SNIFFING OUT THE BASICS: PURPOSES AND DOCTRINES OF
TRADEMARK LAW
When trademark law first developed in the early nineteenth
century, it only offered protection to marks that included company
names.16 As companies grew and marketing became more creative,
the law began to recognize those marks that consumers view today as
traditional trademarks' 7-marks such as the apple symbol for an
Apple computer, the curvy script of Coca-Cola, and McDonald's slogan,
"I'm lovin' it." The enactment of the Lanham Act in 1946 stretched
trademark law to its current limits and left the judicial system with
puzzling questions regarding the feasibility of nontraditional
trademarks like color, sound, and smell.'8
A. What is a Trademark?
The Lanham Act defines a "trademark" as "any word, name,
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof ... used by a person ...
to identify and distinguish his or her goods."' 9 The US Supreme Court
has relied heavily on Congress's stated intent of making the statute
"stronger" and, notably, "more liberal" in its iconic interpretation of
the term.20 In Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., the Court
broadly interpreted the statute and identified a trademark as "almost
anything at all that is capable of carrying meaning."21 Since this
decision, both courts and the USPTO have relied on this expansive
interpretation of the law and have assumed that the statute permits
the registration of nontraditional trademarks because it does not
explicitly exclude them. 22
16. William W. Fisher III, The Growth of Intellectual Property: A History of the
Ownership of Ideas in the United States, in EIGENTUM IM INTERNATIONALEN VERGLEICH 265, 265
(Hannes Siegrist & David Sugarman eds., 1999), available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edul
people/tfisher/iphistory.pdf.
17. Id.
18. See Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1142 (2006).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
20. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995); see also S. REP.
NO. 79-1333, pt. 3 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274.
21. Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 162.
22. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 209 (2000)
(finding that trade dress can be viewed as a trademark); Nextel Commc'ns, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc.,
91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1393 (T.T.A.B. 2009) (noting that sound may function as a trademark); In
re Vertex Grp., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1694 (T.T.A.B. 2009) (noting that sound may function as a
trademark); In re N.V. Organon, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1639 (T.T.A.B. 2006) (noting that a taste
could qualify as a trademark if it can withstand the functionality doctrine).
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The Lanham Act divides a trademark into three distinct
elements.2 3 First, the trademark must include a "tangible symbol."24
Next, the trademark owner must demonstrate actual use of the
trademark in commerce. 25  Finally, the registrant must clearly
identify the feature's function, explaining what the alleged trademark
does in the marketplace.26 The Lanham Act's and the Supreme
Court's broad definitions of a trademark seemingly deem nearly any
symbol registrable and thus protectable under federal law.2 7
B. The Traditional Functions of Trademark Law
Trademarks are often an important factor when a consumer is
considering the purchase of a new product. 28  For this reason,
producers invest much time and money in developing the perfect
network of trademarks to attract a consistent consumer base and
ensure the success of a product.29  Congress developed federal
trademark law in large part to protect producers' significant
investments in their marks and to provide restitution when others
infringe upon producers' rights. 30
Congress was also interested in developing trademark law to
protect the general public. 31 Consumers often shop by focusing on
brand names.32 For example, a consumer who already knows that he
enjoys Kraft Macaroni & Cheese will be more likely to purchase Kraft
Singles rather than relying on an unfamiliar brand for his slices of
cheese. 33 The Lanham Act is structured to support this easy, efficient,
and rational way of shopping.34 Trademarks exist to ensure that the
23. MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 3:1.
24. Id. (interpreting the Lanham Act's definition of a "trademark" as a "word, name,
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof").
25. Id.
26. Id. (interpreting the Lanham Act's requirement to "identify and distinguish the
seller's goods from goods made or sold by others").
27. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995).
28. See MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 2:3.
29. See, e.g., Zareer Pavri, Where the Value in a Trademark Lies, CA MAG., Feb. 1987,
available at http:/Ibvstrategy.com/Where%2OThe%2OValue%20In%20A%2OTrademark%20Lies.
pdf ("Trademarks are bought and sold for a variety of reasons. For example, . . . Procter &
Gamble Co., Cincinnati, purchased . . . Morton-Norwich Products Inc. of Chicago for $371 million
cash, or about 17 times the division's 1981 pre-tax earnings. ). The high premium likely
reflects the value of the "Morton-Norwich" trademark. See id.
30. MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 2:1.
31. Id. § 2:2.
32. Id. § 2:3.
33. See id.
34. Id. §§ 2:3, 2:5.
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consumer can rely on his inference about the Kraft brand. 35
Trademarks that are confusingly similar may dupe a trusting
consumer into buying a different product than he had anticipated. 36
For example, the consumer above may see "Craft" or "Krafft" cheese
and purchase it, because he assumes that it is the same brand as the
original Kraft Macaroni & Cheese. 37 In theory, the potential for
trademark infringement suits deters companies from creating
products that are confusingly similar to their competitors' products,
thus protecting consumers' decisions to trust trademarks. 38
Because trademark law allows consumers to rely on their
expectations about brands, the law also encourages accountability,
competition, and quality products.39 Without a trademark, it would be
difficult for a consumer to determine whose product he likes or
dislikes; thus, the consumer would have a hard time holding the
producer accountable. 40 For example, the macaroni-loving consumer
above would not know to reward Kraft with another purchase if the
original macaroni product lacked the Kraft trademarks. 41 Therefore,
the existence of trademarks gives producers an incentive to create
better and more memorable products than their competitors in the
hopes that consumers will associate the good product with their
trademark and subsequently purchase other products under that
brand. 42 Likewise, if products lacked trademarks, producers would be
encouraged to neglect product development. 43 Consumers would be
unable to determine which producers to hold accountable and little
punishment would therefore exist to deter producers from selling an
unpalatable bowl of macaroni and cheese. 44  These concerns for












45. See id. § 2:1.
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C. The Functionality Doctrine as a Limitation on Trademark
Protection
In addition to defining the scope of trademarks, the Lanham
Act creates a civil cause of action for trademark infringement. 46 A
defendant, however, can overcome such a claim by demonstrating that
the trademark represents a functional feature of the product; this is
known as the functionality doctrine. 47 When the court deems a
supposedly infringed-upon trademark to be "functional," that feature
is not a protectable trademark and the infringement suit will fail. 4 8
Over time, two strands of the functionality doctrine have developed:
utilitarian functionality and aesthetic functionality.4 9
Concerned with maintaining fair competition, utilitarian
functionality ensures that trademark law does not give producers a
monopoly in a feature that the court considers necessary to the sale of
a product.50 In other words, if the product's feature is "essential to the
use or purpose of the article," a court will hold that the feature is not a
protectable trademark.51 For example, a court deemed a dual-spring
mechanism that supported temporary road signs functional because
the design ensured that a sign would remain upright, even in windy
conditions.52 Because a sign must remain upright in order for the
public to see its message, the springs were essential to the proper
functioning of the product; the law must permit other road-sign
producers to use this design in order to ensure fair competition. 53
The Supreme Court elaborated upon the concept of
functionality in Qualitex, a case concerning the alleged infringement
of a trademark consisting entirely of one color. 5 4 The Court explained
that, while the aesthetic functionality doctrine is also centered on fair
competition concerns, the court examines the "aesthetic value" of the
trademark in order to discern its protectability.55 If the trademark
confers "a significant benefit that cannot practically be duplicated by
the use of alternative designs," then a court will find it aesthetically
46. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006).
47. See id. § 1125(a)(3).
48. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164-65 (1995).
49. See, e.g., TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 31 (2001)
(discussing the impact of utilitarian functionality on a trademark's protectability); Qualitex, 514
U.S. at 169-70 (explaining the concept of aesthetic functionality).
50. See Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1952).
51. See Porter v. Farmer Supply Serv., Inc., 617 F. Supp. 1175, 1189 (D. Del. 1985).
52. TrafFix Devices, 532 U.S. at 31.
53. See id.
54. See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 169-70.
55. Id. at 170 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17 (1995)).
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functional and thus unprotectable.5 6  For example, a boat-engine
manufacturer may not trademark black for the color of its boat
engines.57  Traditionally, engine manufacturers deliberately use
neutral colors that will coordinate with the color of boat exteriors in
order to increase sales.5 8 Depriving other manufacturers of the use of
black-the most neutral of colors-would hinder competition, thus
ignoring an integral goal of trademark law and failing the aesthetic
functionality test.59
D. Barton Beebe's Semiotic Analysis of Trademarks
Diverting from the traditional economic perspective on
trademarks, Professor Barton Beebe posits in his oft-cited 2004
article, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, that trademarks
function as traditional signs based on a semiotic analysis.60 Professor
Beebe explains that every sign consists of three elements: a signifier, a
referent, and the signified.61 The signifier is the perceptible element
of the sign.62 For example, the word "Kraft" is what the consumer sees
when looking at boxes of macaroni in the supermarket aisle; thus,
"Kraft" is the signifier. The referent might be a "physical 'object of the
world' or a mental entity 'of the nature of thought or of a sign."' 6 3 One
can think of it as the object of the sign-the thing to which the sign is
referring. 64 In the Kraft example, the macaroni and cheese is the
referent. Finally, the signified is the "effect of the sign."65 Upon
seeing a Kraft product, the consumer trusts the product; this resulting
goodwill is the signified.
56. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17 (1995)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
57. Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull Ltd., 35 F.3d 1527, 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
58. Id.
59. See id.; see also supra Part I.A.
60. See Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 621
(2004). According to Westlaw, other sources have cited Beebe's article seventy times in the eight
years since he published it. Also, semiotics is the "science of communication studied through the
interpretation of signs and symbols." Semiotics, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.
com/view/Entry/175724?redirectedFrom=semiotics#eid (last updated Dec. 2011).
61. Id. at 636 (elaborating upon the Peircean triadic sign model).
62. See id.
63. Id. (quoting 1 CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, COLLECTED PAPERS OF CHARLES SANDERS
PEIRCE 372 (Charles Hartshorne & Paul Weiss eds., 1934)).
64. See Winfried N6th, Representation and Reference According to Peirce, 1 INT'L J.
SIGNS & SEMIOTIC SYS. 28, 29 (2011), available at http://www.irma-international.org/
viewtitle/56445.
65. Beebe, supra note 60, at 636 (quoting 5 CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, COLLECTED
PAPERS OF CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE 538 (Charles Hartshorne & Paul Weiss eds., 1934))
(internal quotation mark omitted).
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The three semiotic elements that Professor Beebe articulates
coordinate perfectly with the requirements of a trademark as set forth
in the Lanham Act. 66 The signifier is the tangible symbol that a
consumer sees; the referent is the way that the producer is using the
symbol; and the signified is the function of the trademark-the
creation of goodwill or ill-will toward the trademark.67 Professor
Beebe emphasizes that each of these elements must be present and
separate in order to create a complete and effective sign.68
Semiotics also explains that the value of a sign contains both
vertical and horizontal aspects. 69  Traditionally, US courts grant
trademark protection if the registrant can demonstrate that the
trademark has earned secondary meaning within the marketplace. 70
Secondary meaning analysis exclusively implicates a vertical
perspective analysis-courts consider the relationship between the
three elements of a trademark and whether consumers strongly
associate the mark with its source (the signifier with its referent).71
Once a court has determined that a trademark is protectable, it will
perform trademark infringement analysis by inquiring only
superficially into horizontal relationships under the likelihood of
confusion test.72
66. See supra text accompanying notes 23-26.
67. See Beebe, supra note 60, at 645-46.
68. See id. at 657-63.
69. See id. at 638-40.
70. See, e.g., Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 791 (5th Cir.
1983) ("[Dlescriptive terms are ordinarily not protectable as trademarks. They may be protected,
however, if they have acquired a secondary meaning for the consuming public."), abrogated by
KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111 (2004).
71. Id. (explaining that a brand name may acquire secondary meaning if it is "known by
the public as specifically designating that product" (quoting Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft
v. Rickard, 492 F.2d 474, 477 (5th Cir. 1974) (internal quotation mark omitted))); see also 15
U.S.C. § 1125 (2006).
72. See, e.g., Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1527 (4th Cir. 1984).
According to Pizzeria Uno, the likelihood of confusion test considers the following factors:
a) the strength or distinctiveness of the mark;
b) the similarity of the two marks;
c) the similarity of the goods/services the marks identify;
d) the similarity of the facilities the two parties use in their businesses;
e) the similarity of the advertising used by the two parties;
f) the defendant's intent;
g) actual confusion.
Id. It is important to note that in a likelihood of confusion analysis, even if courts find that the
trademarks' referents are completely different, the court may still find infringement if the
tangible symbols are similar enough. See Kellogg Co. v. Toucan Golf, Inc., 337 F.3d 616, 625-26
(6th Cir. 2003) ("[C]ourts have held for trademark owners relying heavily on the similarity of the
marks, even where the parties' goods were in different product markets."). This principle
demonstrates that courts engage in only very weak horizontal analysis. See id.
[Vol. 14:3:693702
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Semiotics, on the other hand, emphasizes an in-depth
horizontal analysis: signs are valuable only when the consumer
considers them in relation to other signs.73 Producers value their
trademarks because trademarks identify and distinguish their
products from another company's products. 74 The consumer learns
that he prefers Kraft Macaroni & Cheese only because he has tasted
another brand's inferior version.75 Thus, the mark "Kraft" gains
meaning and value by virtue of a comparison with another mark.76
Embracing the horizontal perspective of semiotics, Professor
Beebe suggests that courts should add a step to the traditional
trademark infringement analysis.77 It is not enough to examine the
vertical perspective-whether the sign has a strong association with
its source-which is the integral consideration in both secondary
meaning and likelihood of confusion analyses.78 Instead, the court
should specifically "determine whether the defendant's
signifier-referent combination is sufficiently similar to the
plaintiffs."7 9 Courts should compare the actual relationships between
the signifier and referent, rather than signifier A to signifier B and
referent A to referent B.8 0  Professor Beebe suggests that
consumer-confusion surveys will play an integral role in this
evaluation.81 His test embraces a more holistic view of the value of
the mark, and it ensures that trademarks fulfill the Lanham Act's
identifying and distinguishing functions.82
II. SOMETHING IS ROTTEN IN THE STATE OF DENMARK: CONFLICTING
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE SCENT MARK
As companies reach across borders, industries continue to
globalize, and the Internet plays a larger role in marketing, it is
becoming increasingly important to recognize how different national
laws will treat the same trademark. Though it seems clear that a
uniform standard would be the most efficient way to create an
73. Beebe, supra note 60, at 639-40.
74. See supra Part L.A.
75. See Beebe, supra note 60, at 640.
76. See id.
77. Id. at 675-76.
78. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
79. Beebe, supra note 60, at 675.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 676.
82. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006); Beebe, supra note 60, at 675-76.
7032012]
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unambiguous and predictable system, there is international
disagreement over the proper treatment of scent marks.83
A. The Absence of a Clear Scent Mark Standard in the United States
As stated above, the Lanham Act provides a sweeping
perspective on trademarks by allowing the USPTO to consider
registration applications for nearly any symbol that identifies a
product.84 Although registration is not a prerequisite to a trademark
infringement suit in US courts, registration with the USPTO creates a
presumption of validity and protection for the mark, which an
opposing party must rebut in court in order to bring suit
successfully.85 If the USPTO rejects a trademark as invalid, the
registrant may appeal the decision to the US Trademark Trial and
Appeal Board (TTAB), an adjudicatory body within the USPTO. 86 The
TTAB explicitly addressed the topic of scent marks for the first time in
1990, and the USPTO has since developed unique requirements for
their registration.87
1. In re Clarke: The Story Begins to Unravel
In the late 1980s, a woman named Celia Clarke undertook a
small business venture and began to sell scented yarn, a product that
would later become iconic in the realm of scent marks.88 Clarke's
trademark application with the USPTO included a written description
detailing the scent as "a high impact, fresh, floral fragrance
reminiscent of [pllumeria blossoms."89  The examining attorney
rejected the application on the grounds that consumers would not
83. See, e.g., Europe Nontraditional Marks Matrices, INTERNATIONAL TRADEMARK
ASSOCIATION, http://www.inta.org/Advocacy/Documents/INTANontraditionalMatrixEurope
CentralAsia2009.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2012) (displaying the varying standards employed by
countries across the world). Countries have also not yet achieved a universal standard regarding
the protectability of many other nontraditional trademarks. See id.
84. See supra Part I.A.
85. See LYDIA PALLAS LOREN & JOSEPH SCOTT MILLER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW:
CASES & MATERIALS 531 (ver. 2.2 2011). Registration also bestows other benefits upon the
trademark owner, including defense against a state law claim of dilution, the ability to make the
mark incontestable, and protection assistance from the US Customs & Border Protection. Id. at
531-32.
86. See generally Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND
TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/process/appeal (last updated Feb. 13,
2012).
87. See infra Part II.A.1-2.
88. In re Clarke, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238, 1238 (T.T.A.B. 1990).
89. Id. (internal quotation mark omitted).
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recognize the scent as an "indication of origin."90 Instead, they would
view the floral scent as a pleasant side effect of the product.9'
The TTAB, however, took a different position.92  Noting
Clarke's emphasis of the product's scent in her advertising campaigns
and the goodwill she had developed with consumers based on the
scent, the TTAB ruled that Clarke had earned the registration of her
scent mark through an adequate showing of secondary meaning. 93
The plaintiff had sufficiently demonstrated that the scent of plumerias
served the functions of a traditional trademark. 94
Despite its acceptance of the scent mark, the TTAB
distinguished the product in Clarke from those "scents or fragrances of
products which are noted for those features, such as perfumes,
colognes or scented household products," upon which it refused to
comment.95 Clarke has become universally recognized as the United
States' acceptance of scent marks.96 The Supreme Court implicitly
affirmed the TTAB's decision by reference in Qualitex.97
2. The Current Registration Procedure for Scent Marks in the United
States
After the TTAB's ruling in the Clarke case, the USPTO altered
its guidelines to address the registration of nontraditional
trademarks. 98  The Trademark Manual of Examination
Procedures (TMEP) advises examining attorneys that scent marks
must comply with the traditional trademark constraints, such as the
functionality test.99 On the other hand, the TMEP disregards the
traditional requirement of a drawing when the registered trademark
is a scent. 00 Instead, the TMEP requires and emphasizes a written
90. Id. at 1239.
91. See id.
92. Id. at 1239-40.
93. Id. at 1240.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1239 n.4.
96. Eleni Mezulanik, The Status of Scents as Trademarks: An International Perspective,
67 INTA BULL. 6, 7 (2012), available at http://www.inta.org/INTABulletin/Documents/
INTABulletinVol67No01.pdf ("[In re Clarke] led to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office's
accepting that scents can function as trademarks.").
97. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995) ("The courts and the
Patent and Trademark Office have authorized for use as a mark a particular shape . . . , a
particular sound . . . , and even a particular scent . . .. If a shape, a sound, and a fragrance can
act as symbols why, one might ask, can a color not do the same?" (citations omitted)).
98. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING
PROCEDURE (8th ed. 2011), available at http://tess2.uspto.gov/tmdb/tmep.
99. See id. § 1202.13.
100. See id. § 807.09.
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description of the mark.101 However, the manual does not describe
what a proper written description includes, the type of language
required,10 2 or the level of specificity necessary.103 Additionally, the
USPTO requires the submission of a specimen, though the manual
again fails to detail any specific requirements for such a specimen. 104
B. The European Union and an Excess of Scent Mark Jurisprudence
In an effort to strengthen domestic economies and unite
European peoples, several countries came together on March 25, 1957
to sign the Treaty of Rome, which established the predecessor to the
European Union (EU).0o Even before the enactment of the Treaty of
Rome, the countries of Europe had recognized a need for a general
adjudicatory body and formed the court that is now known as the
ECJ.106 Today, the ECJ is tasked with ruling on EU law and
answering questions that come from the national courts of individual
European nations.10 7 A decision by the ECJ, however, affects only EU
law; it does not preclude a contrary ruling by EU member-states'
national courts on a domestic issue.108
The European Union passed its first trademark directive in
1988.109 It defined a trademark as "any sign capable of being
represented graphically, . . . provided that such signs are capable of
distinguishing the goods or services of one undertaking from those of
101. See id.
102. For example, an appropriate written description might include a chemical formula,
the scientific categorization for the scent, or language that is understandable to the average
consumer, but the TMEP makes no such specification. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id. § 903.03(m).
105. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community arts. 1-3, Mar. 25,
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3.
106. See CIA, European Union, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ee.html (last updated Feb. 21, 2012); European Court of
Justice, EUROFOUND, http://www.eurofound.europa.eulareas/industrialrelations/dictionary/
definitions/europeancourtofustice.htm (last updated Sept. 21, 2011) (stating that the Court of
Justice of the European Communities was created in 1952).
107. Id.
108. See European Law, BRITANNICA ONLINE ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.britannica.
com/EBchecked/topic/1443520/European-law/276638/The-European-Union-and-the-Council-of-
Europe (last visited Oct. 29, 2011).
109. See Council Directive 89/104, 1989 O.J. (L 40) 1, 1-7 (EC), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eulLexUriServLexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31989L104:en:HTML. EU directives
describe goals that the European Union would like its member states to achieve. What Are EU
Directives? EUROPEAN COMM'N, http://ec.europa.euleu_1aw/index en.htm (last updated Aug. 17,
2011). The member countries must "adapt their laws to meet these goals, but are free to decide
how to do so." Id.
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other undertakings."o10 Much like the Lanham Act, the EU directive
recognizes a broad definition of trademarks.111 Also like the Lanham
Act, it fails to address scent marks explicitly, emphasizing instead a
trademark's ability to distinguish one product from another. 112
The EU definition of trademarks remained unchanged when
the EU government enacted an additional trademark regulation in
1993.113 This regulation established an Office for Harmonization in
the Internal Market (the Office). 114 As the trademark registration
organization for the European Union, the Office is tasked with
registering trademarks that are valid throughout the entire European
Union: community trademarks.115 The Office's relationship with the
ECJ mirrors the USPTO's relationship with US courts: while one
registers and adjudicates trademarks, the other serves as the final
arbiter on disputes arising from those trademarks.116
The contrary rulings from the ECJ, European national courts,
and the Office have generated confusion regarding the viability of
registering a scent mark that is valid throughout the European
Union.117
1. The European Court of Justice Denies Registration
The ECJ definitively rejected the registration of a scent mark
in 2002 and has continued this trend ever since.118 In Sieckmann v.
Deutches Patent-und Markenamt (German Patent and Trade Mark
Office), German courts referred to the ECJ the question of whether a
mark described as "the pure chemical substance methyl cinnamate
( cinnamic acid methyl ester)," could be registered for use in the
110. Council Directive 89/104, supra note 109, art. 2.
111. Id.; cf. supra Part I.A.
112. Council Directive 89/104, supra note 109, art. 2.
113. Council Regulation 40/94, art. 4, 1994 O.J. (L 11) 1 (EC), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eulLexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31994R0040:en:HTML. Upon passage, EU
regulations have immediate and "binding legal force" throughout the European Union. What Are
EU Regulations?, EUROPEAN COMM'N, http://ec.europa.euleu-lawlintroduction/what-regulation
en.htm (last updated Aug. 17, 2011).
114. Council Regulation 40/94, supra note 113, art. 2.
115. Welcome to OHIM, OFFICE FOR HARMONIZATION IN THE INTERNAL MKT., http://oami.
europa.eulows/rw/pages/index.en.do (last updated Feb. 17, 2012).
116. Judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union, OFFICE FOR
HARMONIZATION IN THE INTERNAL MKT., http://oami.europa.eulows/rw/pages/RCD/caseLawl
judgementsECJ.en.do (last updated May 12, 2011).
117. See infra Part II.B.1-3.
118. Case C-273/00, Sieckmann v. Deutches Patent-und Markenamt (German Patent and
Trade Mark Office), 2002 E.C.R. 1-11754, available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/showPdf.jsf?
text=&docid=47585&pageIndex=O&doclang=EN&mode=doc&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid= 11592
68; see also 1 ANNE GILSON LALONDE, GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 2.11(3) (2011).
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realm of business management and administration. 119 The registrant
added, in layman's terms, that the scent is "balsamically fruity with a
slight hint of cinnamon."120 In addition to these descriptions, the
registrant submitted the chemical formula of the scent, as well as
sample specimens. 121 The German court had already found that the
scent mark would distinguish the registrant's service from its
competitors.122
Despite the applicant's excess of descriptions and
specifications, the ECJ denied registration.123 Referencing arguments
from governments in Austria and the United Kingdom, the ECJ
explained that it had to interpret the graphic representation
requirement in compliance with the registration process's stated
purpose of notifying other producers of the trademark's existence.124
The court determined that a trademark "may consist of a sign which is
not in itself capable of being perceived visually, provided that it can be
represented graphically, particularly by means of images, lines or
characters, and that the representation is clear, precise,
self-contained, easily accessible, intelligible, durable and objective." 2 5
As few members of the general public understand a chemical formula,
the court deemed such a submission insufficient to satisfy the graphic
representation requirement.126 Additionally, the court noted, the
formula is a representation of the substance emitting the scent rather
than the scent itself.127 Moreover, while the written descriptions of
the methyl cinnamate were certainly graphic, the court concluded they
were not sufficiently precise to satisfy the requirement.128
2. The Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market Accepts
Registration
Despite the ECJ's unambiguous rejection of scent marks, the
Office has taken a different position-allowing some scent marks,
119. Case C-273/00, Sieckmann v. Deutches Patent-und Markenamt, 2002 E.C.R. I-
11754, 1-11760.
120. See id. at 1-11761 (internal quotation marks omitted).
121. See id. at 1-11760 (stating the formula as "C6H5-CH = CHCOOCH3 " (internal
quotation mark omitted)).
122. See id. at 1-11761.
123. See id. at 1-11764.
124. See id. at 1-11775-77.
125. Id. at I-11771.
126. See id. at 1-11777.
127. See id. at 1-11773.
128. See id. at 1-11774-75.
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though not all.12 9  Acknowledging the graphic representation
requirement, the Office allowed the registration of a mark for tennis
balls that emanated the scent of "fresh cut grass" in Vennootschap
onder Firma Senta Aromatic Marketing v. Markgraaf B. V.130 Because
this scent is so readily recognizable by the general public, the Office
deemed its description precise enough to satisfy the graphic
representation requirement.131
3. An Example of European Union Domestic Law: The United
Kingdom
In the face of conflicting rulings in the ECJ and the Office,
individual countries have continued to make their own decisions
regarding the permissibility of scent marks under their domestic
laws. 132 The United Kingdom has attracted attention for accepting
scent marks. 133 Despite its integration of the EU regulations into
domestic law, the UK Register Office accepted its first scent mark
registration in 1996134: a "floral fragrance/smell reminiscent of roses
as applied to t[i]res" 135 for the Sumitomo Rubber Company. The UK
Register Office also granted registration for "the strong smell of bitter
beer applied to flights for darts."13 6
That same day, Chanel attempted to register the scent of its
perfume, Chanel No. 5.137 The company provided a written
description of the scent:
[A] "scent of aldehydic-floral fragrance product, with an aldehydic top note from
aldehydes, bergamont, lemon and neroli; an elegant floral middle note, from jasmine,
rose, lily of the valley, orris and ylang-ylang; and a sensual feminine note from sandal,
129. See Case R 156/98-2, Vennootschap onder Firma Senta Aromatic Mktg. v.
Markgraaf B.V. (1999), available at http://oami.europa.eulegaldocs/boa/1998/EN/RO156_1998-
2.pdf.
130. Id.
131. Id. But see CTM-ONLINE - Detailed Trade Mark Information, THE TRADE MARKS &




visited Mar. 5, 2012) (where the Office rejected an application to register the "smell of ripe
strawberries" for use on leather goods and clothing, among other things).
132. See Carsten Schaal, The Registration of Smell Trademarks in Europe: Another EU




135. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
136. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
137. Id.
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cedar, vanilla, amber, civet and musk. The scent is also being known by the written
brand name No. 5."138
Despite the detail in this graphic representation, the UK Register
Office denied the trademark application, explaining its decision only
by saying the smell of the perfume "is the good itself."139 This trifecta
of UK rulings demonstrates the freedom that each EU country has to
make its own decisions regarding the registration of scent marks
under its domestic laws. The additional national court rulings,
combined with the already conflicting rulings from the ECJ and
international organizations, serve only to further confuse producers
hoping to protect their scent marks.
C. The International Trademark Association Remains Vague
The International Trademark Association (INTA), a
well-respected nonprofit that promotes trademark-protection
legislation, has informally proposed guidelines that encourage
registration of scent marks. 140 In a letter to the Japanese Patent
Office, INTA suggested that scent marks should: "consist of a written
description that conveys the identity of the scent clearly and
unambiguously and permits its differentiation from other scents.
Additional representations might include submitting a sample of the
scent ... or a chemical formula .... [T]hese should not substitute for
the written description . . . ."141 Despite having passed resolutions on
the topics of touch marks, color trademarks, three-dimensional marks,
and sound marks, however, INTA has yet to pass an official resolution
on scent marks.142
III. IT LOOKS BAD AND SMELLS WORSE: POINTS OF DIVERGENCE IN
SCENT MARK JURISPRUDENCE
The conflicting standards in both the United States and
Europe 43 have prompted significant discourse among scholars and
138. Id.
139. Id. See infra notes 166-68 and accompanying text (explaining the rationale behind
the UK Register Office's decision).
140. See Letter from Richard Heath, President, Int'l Trademark Assoc., to Legislative
Affairs Office, Japan Patent Office (Mar. 24, 2009), available at http://www.inta.org/
Advocacy/Documents/March242009.pdf.
141. Id.
142. See Topic Portal: Nontraditional Marks, INT'L TRADEMARK ASS'N,
http://www.inta.org/Advocacy/PagesfNontraditionalMarks.aspx (last visited Oct. 29, 2011).
143. For the purposes of this Note, "Europe" includes all of the sources of European law,
including the ECJ, the Office, and EU member states' domestic laws.
710 [Vol. 14:3:693
NEW STANDARD FOR SCENT MARKS
practitioners over the viability of scent marks. 144 The major points of
contention in the scent mark debate fall into four categories: the
written description requirement, the functionality doctrine, scent
depletion theory, and scent confusion theory.
A. Varying Standards within the Written Description Requirement
The purpose of trademark registration is not solely to
strengthen the right to protection by earning a presumption of validity
in court; registration also puts other producers on notice that a
trademark is already in use. 145 Thus, the written description of the
trademark is incredibly important; it defines the scope of the
trademark and the boundaries of competitors' expected liability.146
Unfortunately, neither the United States nor Europe offers any
clear guidelines as to what constitutes a sufficient written
description.147 While the USPTO certainly requires a written
description, the TMEP does not specify which details a registrant
must include in that description. 1 4 8 Furthermore, the United States
has yet to create case law that provides further direction on the
written description.149
In contrast, Europe has conflicting case law regarding the
elements of a written description.150 As EU law stands, the decision of
the ECJ in Sieckmann implies that the graphic representation
requirement renders the registration of a scent mark incredibly
difficult, if not impossible. 15 1 The ECJ has deemed the combination of
a chemical formula, chemical name, and common-language description
riddled with familiar olfactory terms insufficient in this regard. 152 If
these graphic representations do not satisfy the ECJ, the trademark
owner is left to wonder what description would be sufficient.
144. See infra Part III.B-D.
145. Case C-273/00, Sieckmann v. Deutches Patent-und Markenamt (German Patent and
Trade Mark Office), 2002 E.C.R. 1-11754, available at http://curia.europa.euljuris/showPdf.jsf?
text=&docid=47585&pagendex=0&doclang=EN&mode=doc&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=11592
68.
146. See id. at 1-11769.
147. See supra Parts II.A.2, II.B. 1-2.
148. See supra Part II.A.2.
149. Jay M. Burgett, Hmm ... What's That Smell? Scent Trademarks-A United States
Perspective, 64 INTA BULL. 5, 5 (2009), available at http://www.inta.org/INTABulletin/
Documents/INTABulletinVol64noo5.pdf ("Since the Clarke decision there have not been a large
number of scent mark applications filed with the USPTO, so there remains little guidance for
future applicants in this area.").
150. See supra Part I.B. 1-2.
151. See supra Part I.B. 1.
152. See supra Part I.B. 1.
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The Office's decision in Markgraaf might provide some
guidance, but Markgraaf is difficult to reconcile with the ECJ's
decision in Sieckmann.153 The ECJ deemed the graphic representation
in Sieckmann inadequate because it failed to provide proper
notification of the scent mark to other producers; 154 yet the wordy
description that the ECJ rejected in Sieckmann155 appears to be more
precise than the mere reference to "fresh cut grass" in Markgraaf.156
The conflicting opinions from two authoritative organizations in EU
trademark law generate much confusion for those producers hoping to
register scent marks.
Moreover, individual countries have the opportunity to create
their own requirements for a graphic representation. 167 Though many
nations have incorporated the EU trademark regulation into domestic
law, domestic courts remain free to interpret their statutes as they
wish.158 Adding domestic laws and judicial rulings atop the already
opposing viewpoints of the Office and the ECJ creates an increasingly
tangled web of standards that prevents a producer from finding a clear
requirement on which it can rely.
The conflicting and unclear guidance from both the United
States and Europe amounts to ambiguity regarding what constitutes
an adequate written description. While commonplace or easily
recognizable scents might satisfy the graphic representation
requirement according to certain European regulatory bodies, those
same simplistic descriptions might fall victim to another
organization's high standards. The United States may accept a
chemical formula, but the European Union will likely reject it. The
lack of clear guidance makes it difficult for producers to predict what
constitutes an adequate written description.
153. See supra Part II.B.1-2.
154. See supra notes 118-28 and accompanying text.
155. Case C-273/00, Sieckmann v. Deutches Patent-und Markenamt (German Patent and
Trade Mark Office), 2002 E.C.R. 1-11754, 1-11760-61, available at http://curia.europa.euijuris/
showPdf.jsf~text=&docid=47585&pageIndex=O&doclang--EN&mode=doc&dir=&occ=first&part=1
&cid=1159268 (describing mark as "balsamically fruity with a slight hint of cinnamon" and "the
pure chemical substance methyl cinnamate (= cinnamic acid methyl ester)" (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
156. Case R 156/1998-2, Vennootschap onder Firma Senta Aromatic Mktg. v. Markgraaf
B.V. (1999), available at http://oami.europa.eullegaldocs/boa/1998/EN/R0156_1998-2.pdf.
157. See INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE, MANUAL OF TRADE MARKS PRACTICE ch. 1, §
3.1(d), available at http://www.ipo.gov.uk/tmmanual-chapl-newapp.pdf ("A representation of the
mark . . . in the format that registration is sought must be provided."). But see, e.g., 3 OSCAR
BACOT & JUAN E. VANRELL, TRADEMARKS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD § 172:12 (2011) ("[In
Uruguay, t]he registration of . .. olfactory marks will remain conditional on the availability of
suitable technical means that would allow the examiner to analyze such marks. . . . Scent and
moving marks are not registrable.").
158. See European Law, supra note 108.
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Some legal scholars believe that the written description
requirement is impossible to satisfy for scent marks.x1 9 Douglas
Churovich, an IP practitioner, argues that "accurate scent descriptions
cannot effectively be communicated through language."160 Written
descriptions of scents are necessarily imprecise, he concludes, so the
US trademark register will never be capable of producing a uniformly
understood description. 161
B. The Potentially Bizarre Results of Functionality Doctrine
Application
The functionality doctrine is one of the most significant
limitations on trademark law; it ensures producers do not use
trademark law to protect product features that are vital to fair
competition.162 Scent marks, however, pose an interesting challenge
to the well-established doctrine: Are scents associated with products
like perfume and air fresheners eligible for registration?
Both US and European courts commented indirectly on the
functionality doctrine in their scent mark opinions. In Clarke, the
TTAB ruled that a particular floral odor associated with yarn was a
protectable scent mark, yet it explicitly refused to comment upon "the
registrability of scents or fragrances of products which are noted for
those features, such as perfumes, colognes or scented household
products."163 By distinguishing the yarn at issue in Clarke from those
products that are traditionally associated with smells, the TTAB
implied that the latter scent marks would not be registrable. 164 An
application of the functionality doctrine is likely the reason behind the
TTAB's reluctance to recognize scents that are the essential feature of
a product. 165
Similarly, even after readily registering trademarks for
beer-scented darts and rose-infused tires, the UK Registry Office
denied a trademark registration for Chanel No. 5.166 The Office
159. See, e.g., Douglas D. Churovich, Scents, Sense or Cents?; Something Stinks in the
Lanham Act, 20 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 293, 308 (2001).
160. Id. at 312.
161. See id. at 305-06.
162. See supra Part I.C.
163. In re Clarke, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238, 1239 n.4 (T.T.A.B. 1990).
164. See id.
165. See supra Part I.C. The sole purpose of perfume is to emanate a scent; thus, scent is
a feature that is "essential to the use or purpose of the article." Porter v. Farmers Supply Serv.,
Inc., 617 F. Supp. 1175, 1189 (D. Del. 1985). The functionality doctrine denies such a feature the
benefit of trademark registration. See id. Furthermore, the TMEP later stated explicitly that the
functionality doctrine must be applied in the registration of scent marks. See supra Part lI.A.2.
166. See Schaal, supra note 132.
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denied registration of the perfume's scent because the scent was, in
fact, "the good itself."167 Again, the refusal to register the scent of a
perfume suggests that the UK Registry Office applied the
functionality doctrine. 168
Despite both European and US courts' willingness to apply the
functionality doctrine to scent marks, the doctrine's presence in scent
mark jurisprudence still attracts criticism from legal scholars and
practitioners. 16 9  James Hawes, who later became Celia Clarke's
attorney, contributed the most significant commentary on whether the
functionality doctrine should apply to scent marks. 170  Although
Hawes acknowledges that scents associated with certain products, like
tissues or laundry detergents, function to make the product more
marketable, he argues that the "mere possession of a function does not
render a mark functional."171  Hawes explains that the producer
exercised his own genius in order to create the scent and that denying
registration does not further trademark law's goal of protecting the
creator's investment. 172
Bolstering his argument that the functionality doctrine has no
place in scent mark jurisprudence, Hawes argues that the
functionality doctrine exists to avoid hindering competition, yet denial
of scent mark registration in the perfume industry encourages unfair
competition. 173 It is incredibly expensive to create and launch a new
perfume, costing "tens of millions of dollars."1 7 4 While designers spend
exorbitant amounts of money to create new signature scents, free
riders can easily copy those fragrances, 75 profiting off of the costly
research and development in which the designers invested.176 Hawes
167. Id.
168. See supra text accompanying note 139.
169. See, e.g., James E. Hawes, Fragrances as Trademarks, 79 TRADEMARK REP. 134,
150-54 (1989) (discussing the reasons why scent marks work in the context of foods, tissues, and
perfumes); Moon-Ki Chai, Article, Protection of Fragrances Under the Post-Sale Confusion
Doctrine, 80 TRADEMARK REP. 368, 372 (1990) (arguing that "the policy interests behind the
functionality doctrine do not apply" to the perfume industry).
170. See generally Hawes, supra note 169.
171. Id. at 150-53.
172. See id.
173. See id. at 152-53.
174. Chandler Burr, The Scent of the Nile, NEW YORKER, Mar. 7, 2005, http://www.
chandlerburr.com/articles/chandlerdetail.htm#top.
175. In the past, it was difficult to create generic versions of designer perfumes, but
companies now use "chromatography, mass spectroscopy, nuclear magnetic resonance
spectroscopy, high-pressure liquid chromatography and other sophisticated techniques,
[resulting in] analyses [that] are quite rapid and precise, thereby facilitating the formulations of
copycats." PERFUMES: ART, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY 469 (P.M. Miller & Dietmar Lamparsky
eds., 1994) (alterations in original).
176. See Hawes, supra note 169, at 152-53.
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argues that denying a scent mark registration encourages this unfair
competition,177 and therefore it is not advisable for the law to classify
perfume fragrances as functional.178  He posits that awarding
perfumes scent mark registration better serves the overarching goals
of trademark law.179
C. The Competitive Need for Scents and the Dangers of Scent Depletion
When it first considered the registration of nontraditional
trademarks, the Supreme Court addressed the hypothetical problem of
depletion in Qualitex.180 Differentiating colors from the fanciful words
that the USPTO and courts typically protect as trademarks, the
opponent of color mark registration in that case argued that colors are
"in limited supply."181 In other words, a finite number of colors exist
in the world.182 Thus, the argument followed, the amount of potential
color marks would diminish with each color mark awarded, and
businesses would eventually be left with no colors. 83 Competitors
would find themselves at a "significant disadvantage," vitiating
trademarks' typical pursuit of fair competition.184  The Court in
Qualitex, however, rejected the color depletion argument, citing the
functionality doctrine as the solution to this potential problem.'85 If it
were ever likely that the award of a color mark would result in
harming competition, the aesthetic functionality doctrine would force
the USPTO to reject registration.'8 6
Hawes and Moon-Ki Chai, a Japanese practitioner, both argue
that scent depletion is no more of a concern than color depletion. 87
Courts need not even look toward the functionality doctrine as a
limitation because there are "innumerable possible scent combinations
and variations."18 8
177. See id.
178. See id. at 153.
179. See id.





185. See id. at 169.
186. See id. at 172-73; see, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull Ltd., 35 F.3d 1527,
1532 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (where the USPTO rejected a boat engine manufacturer's application to
register the very desirable, neutral color of black as a trademark for boat engines based on
aesthetic functionality rationale and the need for fair competition).
187. See Hawes, supra note 169, at 152; Chai, supra note 169.
188. See Hawes, supra note 169, at 153; see also Chai, supra note 169 (declaring "an
infinite number of distinguishable scents").
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Despite the Court's response to the depletion argument in
Qualitex and the theory that a potentially infinite number of scents
exist, some scholars continue to argue the danger of fragrance
depletion in the context of scent marks.189 Bettina Elias, an American
IP practitioner, argues that courts have previously reasoned that color
depletion is a non-issue only in those cases where there is "no
competitive need" for colors.190 Applying this "competitive need" test
to scents, scent depletion becomes a much stronger argument.191
Within the realms of household cleaners and personal care products,
consumer preferences have demanded scents. 192 For example, Elias
cites consumer preferences for "soft" smells for tissues and "fresh"
smells for laundry detergent. 193  When buyers strongly prefer a
particular genre of smells for a product, a manufacturer can
necessarily use only a limited amount of scents successfully. 194
Because it appears that the competitive need for scents is much
greater than for colors, the scent depletion argument could preclude
the possibility of scent mark registration.19 5
D. The Subjectivity of Smell and the Likelihood of Scent Confusion
In another attempt to distinguish color marks from traditional
trademarks, the party arguing against trademark protection in
Qualitex asserted that the registration of a color mark is impossible
due to "shade confusion."196  The opponents argued that the
registration of color marks would result in too much uncertainty and
"unresolvable court disputes," because color shades vary based on
lighting and therefore can be confusingly similar.197 The Court
rejected this argument, asserting that color is not "special";198 courts
often face difficult decisions regarding whether trademarks are too
confusingly similar, so colors should not present a unique challenge. 99
189. E.g., Bettina Elias, Do Scents Signify Source?-An Argument Against Trademark
Protection for Fragrances, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 475, 489 (1992).
190. See id. at 488 (quoting In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
1195, 1198 (T.T.A.B. 1984), rev'd, 774 F.2d 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).





196. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 167 (1995).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See id.; see also In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1123 (Fed. Cir.
1985) ("[D]eciding likelihood of confusion among color shades ... is no more difficult or subtle
than deciding likelihood of confusion where word marks are involved." (quoting In re
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The opinion noted that, if need be, courts can easily reproduce lighting
conditions that may affect the perception of the color mark.2 0 0
Scent marks, however, could very well be "special," presenting
more unique problems to the likelihood of confusion analysis. 201 The
number of variables that influence the perception of scent is so great
that judges may be unable to conduct a traditional likelihood of
confusion analysis. 202 Because people experience scents through the
perception of gas molecules, 203 "temperature, humidity, and wind
conditions can all strengthen or weaken the potency of a scent."204
Thus, environmental conditions play a significant role in determining
a scent's capacity to identify and distinguish a product. For example,
a consumer might easily recognize a scent mark indoors, where the air
is still and warm, yet the consumer may be more likely to confuse that
previously strong scent with a different scent mark when exposed to
windy, cooler conditions. Even in identical environmental conditions,
scents are highly subjective based on the person smelling the odor.205
For example, women generally have a better sense of smell than
men.206 Furthermore, women's sense of smell is apt to change based
on monthly hormonal changes. 207  In addition to these gender
differences, age affects olfaction; 208 the sense of smell changes as
people grow older.209 Therefore, the exact same scent in the same
environmental conditions can smell differently to a twenty-year old
woman at the beginning of her menstrual cycle, a twenty-year old
woman in the middle of her cycle, a twenty-year old man, and a
forty-year old woman. 210
The subjectivity in olfactory perception may present an
insurmountable challenge in a likelihood of confusion analysis for
Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1195, 1198 (T.T.A.B. 1984), rev'd, 774 F.2d
1116 (Fed. Cir. 1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
200. Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 167-68.
201. Elias, supra note 189, at 490; Kenneth L. Port, On Nontraditional Trademarks, 38
N. KY. L. REV. 1, 25 (2011) ("[L]essons from osphresiology, the science of smells, teach us that
scents are inappropriate for trademark protection.").
202. See Elias, supra note 189, at 490-91; see also Churovich, supra note 159, at 301-302.
203. Churovich, supra note 159, at 300.
204. Id. at 301 (explaining that higher temperatures increase "the potency of ... scents"
or can even alter the scent itself; "an increase in humidity . . . dampen[s] the potency of nearby
scents"; and "drafty conditions ... cause(} . . . the scent's wafting in different directions"); see
Port, supra note 201 (affirming that "the actual scent that one recognizes is affected by
temperature and humidity").
205. Elias, supra note 189, at 490-91.
206. Id. at 490.
207. Id. at 491.
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scent mark infringement. 211 Unlike in color mark analysis, it appears
that it is nearly impossible to recreate the exact circumstances
surrounding scent perception since the circumstances change
depending upon the consumer and his environment. Thus, judges will
have a difficult time determining even which precise scents are at
issue in an infringement suit, as well as whether those scents are so
similar as to constitute infringement. Because a scent mark
infringement suit has yet to be litigated, it is unclear whether the
courts will find scent confusion a persuasive argument against the
maintenance of scent marks.
IV. THE SWEET SMELL OF VICTORY: THE APPLICATION OF A SEMIOTIC
ANALYSIS TO SCENT MARK REGISTRATION AND INFRINGEMENT
PROCEEDINGS
While the registration of scent marks remains contentious due
largely to practical problems, the USPTO should grant scent marks
protection because they perform the traditional functions of
trademarks. Proven to evoke past experiences and memories, 212 smell
is one of the most emotive senses. 213 An individual's ability to
associate aromas with memories demonstrates a scent's capability to
fulfill trademark's primary identifying and distinguishing functions.214
Just as a consumer remembers the brand name "Kraft" when
shopping for cheese products, that same consumer can remember the
scent of cherry that he once encountered when shopping for fuel
additives. That consumer might pick up each competing bottle of fuel
additive, flip open the cap, and continue shopping until the familiar
waft of cherries reaches his nose. Furthermore, protecting scent
marks would fulfill the goal of protecting companies' investments in
intellectual property. As companies continue to realize the power of
scent, they pour money into the development of scent technology and
211. See id. at 490.
212. See CHRISTOPHER H. HAWKES & RICHARD L. DoTY, THE NEUROLOGY OF OLFACTION
33 (2009) ("Humans have an uncanny ability to remember smells, and from an early age odors
quickly become associated with environmental objects . . . . [MIemory, emotion, and smell
frequently seem to be interrelated.").
213. Id.
214. See supra Part I.A.
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the exploration of scent marks.215 Trademark law should protect the
significant investments that companies are making. 216
This Note proposes solving the problems that scent mark
registration generates by incorporating Professor Beebe's semiotic
analysis into the USPTO's registration procedure and trademark
infringement proceedings in US courts.217 A thorough and categorized
registration process would help remedy complications that the written
description and functionality doctrine present to those seeking
protection for scent marks. Furthermore, the replacement of the
traditional trademark infringement test with consumer-confusion
surveys eliminates the risks of scent depletion and confusion.
A. Scent Mark Registration
Presently, an application to register a scent mark in the United
States requires not only the submission of both a written description
and a specimen, but also evidence of actual use and secondary
meaning.218  Proper registration of a scent mark creates a
presumption that the trademark is protected. 219  In lieu of this
procedure, this Note proposes that the USPTO require a thorough
description of the proposed trademark through an explanation of each
of the semiotic elements of a sign: signifier, referent, and signified. 220
These categories will reflect many of the requirements that the
USPTO already imposes and will result in the same presumption of
protection.
1. A New Application Procedure: The Elements of a Sign
The first element of a sign under semiotic analysis is the
signifier. 221  In the case of a scent mark-for example, Cherry
Bomb 222-the scent of cherries is the signifier. As both the Lanham
215. See, e.g., Singapore-Israel Industrial R&D Foundation Invests $2.8m in Four New
Projects, SING. Bus. REV. (July 20, 2011), http://sbr.com.sg/information-technology/morenews/
singapore-israel-industrial-rd-foundation-invests-28m-in-four-new-p (announcing that SIIRD
paid $2.8 million into four projects, including the development of digital scent technology that
will be made available to consumers for use in video game experiences).
216. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 38-39 and
accompanying text.
217. See supra Parts ID, II.A.2.
218. See supra Part II.A.2.
219. See LOREN & MILLER, supra note 85 ("[Registration provides prima-facie evidence of
the validity of the mark. [Thus, for registered marks,] the burden is shifted to the defendant to
prove a problem with the mark that would prevent protection.").
220. See supra Part I.D.
221. See supra Part I.D.
222. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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Act and the EU trademark directive require, an applicant must
explain the signifier through a written description or, in EU
terminology, a "graphic representation."223
This Note proposes that an applicant generate his scent mark's
written description by utilizing Perfumery Radar methodology. 224
Perfumery Radar is a novel classification system for perfumes
developed in 2010.225 It predicts perfume classification by placing the
scent within one of the following eight olfactive families: citrus, fruity,
floral, green, herbaceous, musk, oriental, and woody.226 It "analyze[s]
the odor of perfumes, and map[s] out what scents are present, and in
what proportions."227 An applicant should engage Perfumery Radar
methodology prior to registration and submit the results, including
the gas chromatography, 228 as the written description of the signifier.
The applicant should then describe the referent. 229 In the case
of Cherry Bomb, fuel additive is the referent. The referent would
provide context for the trademark and would encompass the "use"
requirement of the current registration procedure. The applicant
could submit a specimen in order to satisfy the referent requirement,
but the USPTO would not require such a submission due to the
unreliable nature of a specimen. 230  An applicant could also
demonstrate a referent, for example, through advertisements that
celebrate the sweet scent of cherries emanating from a car's exhaust
pipe or statements from manufacturers and carriers of the additive
that confirm its association with cherries. The USPTO should accept
any evidence that explains to what product or service the smell
actively applies.
Finally, the applicant should provide evidence of the
signified. 31 The public's recognition of a cherry scent in the context of
car fuel would constitute sufficient evidence of signified goodwill. The
223. See supra Parts II.A.2, II.B.
224. See generally Miguel A. Teixeira et al., Perfumery Radar: A Predictive Tool for
Perfume Family Classification, 49 INDUS. & ENGINEERING CHEMISTRY RES. 11764 (2010)
(describing the history of fragrance classification and detailing the research supporting
Perfumery Radar methodology).
225. Id.
226. Id. at 11767.
227. Ben Coxworth, 'Perfumery Radar' Objectively Quantifies Scents, GIZMAG (DEC. 3,
2010, 3:58 PM), http://www.gizmag.com/perfumery-radar-objectively-quantifies-scents/17169.
228. Gas chromatography is a procedure that "separate[s] volatile components of a
mixture." Wake Forest College Dep't of Chemistry, Gas Chromatography, WAKE FOREST UNIV.,
http://www.wfu.edulchem/courses/organic/GC/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2012).
229. See supra Part I.D.
230. See Churovich, supra note 159, at 312 ("[A] physical sample would soon lose its
potency. . .. ").
231. See supra Part I.D.
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signified requirement would be equivalent to the secondary meaning
requirement and could be satisfied in the same manner. Under
current secondary meaning analysis, courts typically consider both
direct and circumstantial evidence, including "amount and manner of
advertising, volume of sales, and length and manner of use";2 3 2
consumer surveys are often dispositive. 233  The USPTO should
evaluate the proposed "signified" element of the registration process
according to the same considerations.
2. The Impact of a Categorized Registration Application
The written description has been one of the most contentious
topics in the debate regarding scent mark registration,234 because an
unambiguous written description is an integral part of trademark
registration. 2 35 The Perfumery Radar could create a baseline for
objective written descriptions that other applicants could easily
understand and utilize in the development of their own products. 236
The system's utility justifies the potential added expense of requiring
registrants to engage the novel technology of Perfumery Radar
classifications. Uniform use of this methodology and its classification
system would give adequate notice to competitors, who will be well
versed in the system due to their own attempts to develop scent
marks. Furthermore, Alirio Rodrigues, one of the system's creators,
points out that because Perfumery Radar can correctly predict the
classification of an odor, "it can be used in the pre-formulation step of
perfumes or other fragrant mixtures";237 thus, competitors could use
Perfumery Radar during the development stage of their scent in order
to predict and avoid potential infringement. 2 38 Researchers found that
Perfumery Radar successfully predicted the perfume industry's
professional classifications of several essential oils and commercial
perfumes;239 proof of the classification system's repeated success
232. Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 795 (5th Cir. 1983).
233. See, e.g., id.
234. See supra Part III.A.
235. See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text (explaining that a written
description puts competitors on notice of a registered scent mark).
236. See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
237. Katie Bird, Perfume Classification System Could Help Pre-Formulation of
Fragrances, COSMETICS DESIGN-EUROPE.COM (Dec. 16, 2010), http://www.cosmeticsdesign-
europe.com/Formulation-Science/Perfume-classification-system-could-help-pre-formulation-of-
fragrances (internal quotation marks omitted).
238. See id.
239. Id. ("According to the study, the Perfumery Radar correctly predicted the primary
olfactive family of four essential oils (orange, lemon, jasmine and thyme) and a number of
commercial perfumes."); Coxworth, supra note 227 ("When 14 popular women's fragrances were
tested on the system, the results were similar to those arrived at by human perfume experts.").
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makes it a good candidate to fulfill the signifier's written description
requirement.
Although it may appear that many of the same requirements
are present in both the semiotic registration process and the current
registration procedure, the semiotic structure provides a
comprehensive way to avoid functionality doctrine problems. 240 When
the signifier and the referent are identical, the functionality doctrine
is triggered;241 such a mark is unregistrable. For example, the scent of
a perfume is the signifier of the trademark. Likewise, the scent of the
perfume is also the referent; therefore, perfumes should not receive
trademark protection. Dividing the registration process into sign
elements simplifies the functionality doctrine determination.
Both US and European courts have implied that the
functionality doctrine is applicable to scent mark registration. 2 4 2 The
need to avoid overstepping boundaries into other forms of intellectual
property protection supports functionality doctrine application.243
While Hawes convincingly argues that applying the functionality
doctrine to scent marks encourages unfair competition, 244 the law has
already provided an adequate protection against this risk through
both trade secrets and patents. 245 It would be against public policy to
afford trademark protection to a product like perfume on top of
existing trade secret and patent protection, because overprotection of
a mark deprives the consumer of the benefits of competition: the
availability of cheaper and perhaps better products. Therefore, the
functionality doctrine is vital even in the unique context of scent
marks because it provides a balance between consumer and producer
interests. A categorized registration process that requires the division
of a scent mark into the three elements of a sign provides a simple
way to uphold the functionality doctrine in a complex context.
240. See Beebe, supra note 60, at 661.
241. See id.
242. See supra Part III. B.
243. See Beebe, supra note 60, at 661.
244. See Hawes, supra note 169, at 152-53.
245. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (stating that patent law protection is available to
"[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof'); see also LOREN & MILLER,
supra note 85, at 27 ("Legal protection for what are known as 'trade secrets' allows holders of
secrets to share the secrets in a controlled way with confidence that the law will protect the
holders from invasive behavior by others .... .").
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B. Scent Mark Infringement
Current trademark infringement analysis hinges upon the
determination of whether a likelihood of confusion exists.246 While
each circuit has developed its own official list of factors, courts
generally consider very similar pieces of information in discerning
whether consumers are likely to confuse two products.247 For example,
the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit considers (1) the
strength of the plaintiffs mark, (2) the relatedness of the goods or
service offered by the parties, (3) the similarity of the marks, (4) any
evidence of actual confusion, (5) the marketing channels used by the
parties, (6) the probable degree of purchaser care and sophistication,
(7) the defendant's intent, and (8) the likelihood of either party
expanding its product line using the marks. 248 No one factor is
dispositive.249
While trademark infringement analysis appears to be
thoroughly based upon the various factors considered, scent marks
require a more direct analysis due to the unique concerns they
present.250  An inquiry into the likelihood of confusion via
consumer-confusion surveys both alleviates the potential problems of
scent confusion and depletion and serves the purposes of trademark
law.251 Consumer-confusion surveys generate an average consumer,
simplifying infringement analysis and eliminating the dangers of
scent confusion; they also permit scents to remain perpetually
available to competitors, mitigating concerns of scent depletion and
ensuring the development of quality products. 252 While courts often
use consumer surveys to determine the protectability of a trademark
before performing a likelihood of confusion analysis, the proposed
consumer-confusion surveys will focus on a precise horizontal
comparison of the trademarks at issue. The exclusive use of these
consumer-confusion surveys should supplant the current trademark
infringement analysis in the realm of scent marks.
246. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
247. See generally LOREN & MILLER, supra note 85, at 563-90.
248. Kellogg Co. v. Toucan Golf, Inc., 337 F.3d 616, 623 (6th Cir. 2003).
249. Id.
250. See supra Part III.C-D.
251. See supra Parts I.A, III.C-D.
252. See infra Part IV.B.1-2.
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1. A New Standard for Scent Mark Infringement:
Consumer-Confusion Surveys
Courts should disregard the traditional likelihood of confusion
factors and instead perform an in-depth horizontal analysis based on
Professor Beebe's semiotic theory. The courts should look exclusively
to consumer-confusion surveys when determining scent mark
infringement. 2 5 3  Both plaintiffs and defendants should have an
opportunity to present their own surveys to the court, in order to
argue the strength and validity of their respective scent marks. While
parties to the infringement suit would have leeway with regard to the
exact structure and execution of their surveys, courts should consider
(1) whether each survey constitutes a random sampling of the
population, (2) whether the conditions of the survey represent a
variety of variables, (3) whether the survey presents the trademarks
in a holistic manner, and (4) which scent mark, if any, prevails.
A truly random sampling of the population would engage a
large number of people from across the country. Furthermore, the
survey should include information regarding the age and gender of the
survey participants. Finally, the survey should include information
regarding the location of the survey, the date the questions were
asked, and other relevant circumstances. Pertinent circumstances
might include the temperature, general degree of windiness, or a
participant's medical conditions that affect his sense of smell.
Because such environmental variables are relevant to the results of
the survey, a survey would be more reliable if it was performed in




Inside 25 F N/A Identified asProduct A
Identified as
Product A
Philadelphia, Outside, Windy outside Identified as Identified as
PA 28* F 54 M (10 mph) Product B Product B
In order to present the trademarks in a holistic manner,
surveyors should give the participants the signifier, as well as the
253. While this Note proposes the use of consumer-confusion surveys only once the court
is faced with allegations of scent mark infringement, producers might also elect to perform their
own surveys periodically in order to anticipate vulnerability to liability.
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referent, free from any other indicative trademarks. For example, in
an infringement suit involving Cherry Bomb, a surveyor would
provide the participant with the cherry scent and the product-fuel
additive. The court would deem the scent mark a success if the
participant demonstrated the third element of the sign-the
signified-by supplying the product's name, Manhattan Oil Cherry
Bomb.254
If the court determines that a sufficient number of participants
correctly identified both the original product and the alleged infringer,
then there is no confusion, and thus no infringement. 255 On the other
hand, suppose Company A holds a registered scent mark for Product
A. If a sufficient number of participants correctly identify Scent A as
Product A and identify Scent B as Product A, then there is
infringement; consequently, Company A should win the appropriate
remedy.256 Again, however, assuming Company A holds a protected
mark, if a significant number of surveyed participants identify both
scents as Product B, there is no infringement and Company B should
gain protection of its scent mark. If the court determines that the
survey participants do not successfully identify either product a
significant portion of the time, the court should show deference to the
USPTO's previous determination of Trademark A's secondary
meaning and the results should reflect the circumstances ex ante:
there would be no infringement, and Company A would continue to
hold a protected mark.
2. The Significance of Consumer-Confusion Surveys
The current likelihood of confusion test gives judges too much
discretion in evaluating infringement cases involving scent marks.
254. By being able to name the origin of the scent, the participant demonstrates that the
signifier-referent combination has earned enough goodwill that the participant has learned the
product's name. Thus, the third element, the signified (goodwill), is demonstrated and a complete
trademark is deemed to exist.
255. See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, A Search-Costs Theory of Limiting
Doctrines in Trademark Law, 97 TRADEMARK REP. 1223, 1243 (2007). Current trends
demonstrate that judges find infringement when there is a showing of "as little as 10[ percent]
consumer confusion." Id. In other words, even if 90 percent of the consumers surveyed can
distinguish between the trademarks at issue, courts will sometimes find infringement. See id.
Thus, courts require strong consumer recognition of products. See id. While the court is in the
best position to determine what constitutes a "sufficient number of participants," judges should
probably find that a sufficient number of participants have correctly identified a product when
90 percent or more of the survey participants have done so.
256. Available remedies in trademark infringement suits include pecuniary damages,
such as recovery of defendant's profits, plaintiffs lost profits, and costs of the action, as well as
equitable relief in the form of injunctions and orders commanding the destruction of all
infringing materials. See LOREN & MILLER, supra note 85, at 674-76.
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The ambiguities that scent marks present necessitate a strong
horizontal analysis based entirely on consumer perception and
trademark comparison. Such an analysis would ensure that
trademarks are fulfilling their identifying and distinguishing
functions, unhindered by the distinct dangers that scent confusion and
depletion can present.257
Even considering the laundry list of factors that help determine
whether a likelihood of confusion exists in any given case, it is
unlikely that judges can take into account the numerous variables
that contribute to scent subjectivity and generate the potential for
scent confusion. A judge's perspective is simply too narrow, even if he
considers himself representative of the typical consumer, because he
represents only one consumer of one gender, age, and environment. A
representative survey, on the other hand, would absorb all of the
variables that make scent confusion a considerable risk. A survey of
individuals from across the country would provide proof that the scent
mark is well known nationally and deserving of federal protection.
Furthermore, a compilation of participants of all genders, ages, and
circumstances would essentially create an "average" consumer on
which a judge could base his decision. If the average consumer
confuses the origin of the two scents, the court should find
infringement and award the appropriate remedy. The survey results
would, however, represent a valid average consumer only if the court
determines that the survey signifies a truly representative sample;
thus, the court should consider the number of participants, age,
gender, and relevant circumstances.
The surveyor should present the scent mark holistically, such
that each of the three semiotic elements is present, in order to validate
the survey's results. The presence of each of the three elements would
guarantee consistency with the newly proposed registration process. 258
As explained previously, each element must exist in order for the
entire sign to be represented accurately. 259 Thus, the absence of one of
the elements in a trademark infringement analysis would create an
unreliable and incomplete test.
Moreover, the three-element requirement would prevent the
infringement analysis from treating trademark holders too harshly.
Rather than granting protection only to those scents (or signifiers)
that are recognizable independent of any product association (or
referent), the infringement analysis would also protect any scent that
is recognizable in association with its referent. Trademark law would
257. See supra Part III.C-D.
258. See supra Part IV.A.1.
259. See supra Part I.D.
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continue to fulfill its goal of protecting the investments that
companies make when developing their trademarks.
While it may seem counterintuitive to consider the possibility
of a previously unregistered trademark winning a trademark
infringement suit and consequently mark protection, this result is the
best means of avoiding a scent depletion problem while continuing to
meet trademark law's objectives. 260 The use of consumer-confusion
surveys would ultimately mean that any protected scent mark would
remain available to a competitor. Companies could invest in the
development of previously registered scents, achieve greater goodwill
than the original protected mark, "win" the consumer-confusion
survey, and thereby receive protection. In other words,
consumer-confusion surveys would allow continuous scent availability
because courts would choose the more successful mark, regardless of
previous registration. According to semiotics, the more successful
mark is the stronger scent mark when compared to other marks.261
Furthermore, the potential to win scent mark protection
through an infringement suit would benefit consumers by fulfilling
trademark law's goal of promoting competition and better products.
This proposed system encourages producers that choose to engage a
scent already in use to develop scent marks and create better
relationships with consumers, thereby achieving strong scent mark
recognition and winning an infringement suit. Likewise, the potential
consequences of an infringement suit would encourage producers to
monitor similar trademarks and bring suit early, before the general
public recognizes competing marks. This would result in more
efficient infringement cases.
Critics might assume that the new infringement analysis
would render registration worthless; however, registration would
continue to serve an important purpose to trademark holders.
Registration puts competitors on notice of the scope of a currently
used trademark.262 Although competitors would technically be able to
win the use of the scent mark through intense product development
and advertising, registration would inform competitors that it is much
easier and more attractive to invest in a different scent mark.
260. See supra Parts IA, III.D.
261. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text (stating that semiotics emphasizes a
horizontal perspective of signs; explaining signs are valuable only in relation to other signs).
262. See supra Part III.A.
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V. CONCLUSION
As technology modernizes and companies explore new ways to
attract loyal customer bases, trademark law must evolve to reflect
these changes. Today, international scent mark jurisprudence
presents an amalgam of confusing and unclear standards for scent
mark registration and infringement claims. While both the United
States and the European Union undoubtedly require a written
description for trademark registration, no country or international
organization has been able to agree upon a clear and uniform
standard that markholders can easily follow. Though judicial systems
across the world seem to apply the functionality doctrine to scent
mark registration, certain practitioners and scholars argue that the
functionality doctrine undermines traditional trademark rationales
when applied to scent marks. Theories of scent depletion and scent
confusion demonstrate concern that scent marks are a unique version
of trademarks that require a customized body of law.
This Note acknowledges the unique implications of scent mark
registration and proposes that streamlining the registration
procedures and infringement analysis for scent marks can alleviate
the concerns arising in scent mark jurisprudence. An objective
written description standard and a categorized registration process
will create an efficient method of registration that puts competitors on
notice of registered scent marks and simultaneously rids the USPTO
of functionality doctrine concerns. The imposition of
consumer-confusion surveys ensures that all scents will remain
available to competing producers, while still promoting high quality,
recognizable products for consumers. Redefining scent mark
registration and infringement procedures through semiotic analysis
ensures a holistic and thorough perspective that serves the traditional
functions of trademark law.
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